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1 Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous function and
existence of a Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two
groups1. Two players are in one group (Group A), and they have the same payoff function
and strategy space, and so their equilibrium strategies, maximin strategies and minimax
strategies are the same. One player, Player C, is in the other group (Group C). We will
show the following results.
1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric in Group A, implies Sion’s
minimax theorem for pairs of a player in Group A and Player C with symmetry in
Group A.
2. Sion’sminimax theorem for pairs of a player inGroupA andPlayer Cwith symmetry
inGroupA implies the existence of aNash equilibriumwhich is symmetric inGroup
A.
Thus, they are equivalent.
An example of such a game is a relative profitmaximization game in aCournot oligopoly.
Suppose that there are three firms, A, B and C in an oligopolistic industry. Let ?̄?𝐴, ?̄?𝐵 and
?̄?𝐶 be the absolute profits of the firms. Then, their relative profits are
𝜋𝐴 = ?̄?𝐴 −
1
2(?̄?𝐵 + ?̄?𝐶), 𝜋𝐵 = ?̄?𝐵 −
1
2(?̄?𝐴 + ?̄?𝐶), 𝜋𝐶 = ?̄?𝐶 −
1
2(?̄?𝐵 + ?̄?𝐶).
We see
𝜋𝐴 + 𝜋𝐵 + 𝜋𝐶 = ?̄?𝐴 + ?̄?𝐵 + ?̄?𝐶 − (?̄?𝐴 + ?̄?𝐵 + ?̄?𝐶) = 0.
Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-sum game2.
If the oligopoly is fully asymmetric because the demand function is not symmetric (in a
case of differentiated goods) or firms have different cost functions (in both homogeneous
and differentiated goods cases), maximin strategies and minimax strategies of firms do
not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if the oligopoly is symmetric
for two firms in one group (Group A) in the sense that demand function is symmetric
and two firms have the same cost function, the maximin strategies for those firms with
the corresponding minimax strategy of the firm in the other group (Group C) constitute a
Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in Group A. In Appendix we present an example of
a three-firms relative profit maximizing oligopoly.
1In Satoh and Tanaka (2018a) we have analyzed a similar problem in a symmetric zero-sum game inwhich
all players are identical.
2About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please seeMatsumura, Matsushima and
Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka
(2013a), Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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2 Themodel and Sion’s minimax theorem
Consider a three-players zero-sum game with two groups. There are three players, A,
B and C. The strategic variables for Players A, B and C are, respectively, 𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶, and
(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ∈ 𝑆𝐴×𝑆𝐵×𝑆𝐶. 𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐵 and 𝑆𝐶 are convex and compact sets in linear topological
spaces. The payoff function of each player is 𝑢𝑖(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶), 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶. They are real
valued functions on 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 × 𝑆𝐶. We assume
𝑢𝐴, 𝑢𝐵 and 𝑢𝐶 are continuous on 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 × 𝑆𝐶, quasi-concave on 𝑆𝑖 for each
𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑗, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, and quasi-convex on 𝑆𝑗 for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 for each 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶.
Three players are partitioned into two groups. Group A and Group C. Group A includes
Player A and Player B, and Group C includes only Player C. In Group A two players are
symmetric, that is, they have the same payoff function, and 𝑆𝐴 = 𝑆𝐵 . Thus, their equilib-
rium strategies, maximin strategies and minimax strategies are the same.
Since the game is a zero-sum game, we have
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) + 𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) + 𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 0, (1)
for given (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
Sion’sminimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let 𝑋 and 𝑌 be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let 𝑓 ∶ 𝑋 × 𝑌 → ℝ be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the
first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
max
𝑥∈𝑋
min
𝑦∈𝑌
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = min
𝑦∈𝑌
max
𝑥∈𝑋
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Let 𝑠𝐵 be given. Then, 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) is a function of 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐶. We can apply Lemma 1
to such a situation, and get the following equation.
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶). (2)
Note that we do not require
max
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
min
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
max
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) given 𝑠𝐶.
Weassume that argmax𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) and argmin𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶 max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶)
are unique, that is, single-valued. By the maximum theorem they are continuous in 𝑠𝐵 .
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Also, throughout this paper we assume that the maximin strategy and the minimax strat-
egy of players in any situation are unique, and the best responses of players in any situation
are unique. Similarly, we obtain
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶), (3)
given 𝑠𝐴3.
Let 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑠. Consider the following function.
𝑠 → arg max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠, 𝑠𝐶).
Since 𝑢𝐴 is continuous, 𝑆𝐴 and 𝑆𝐶 are compact and 𝑆𝐴 = 𝑆𝐵 , this function is also contin-
uous. Thus, there exists a fixed point. Denote it by ̃𝑠. ̃𝑠 satisfies
arg max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = ̃𝑠.
From (2) ̃𝑠 satisfies
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶). (4)
From symmetry for Players A and B, ̃𝑠 also satisfies
arg max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = ̃𝑠,
and
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
3 Themain results
Consider aNash equilibrium of a three-players zero-sum game. Let 𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶 be the values
of 𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶 which, respectively, maximize 𝑢𝐴 given 𝑠𝐵 and 𝑠𝐶, maximize 𝑢𝐵 given 𝑠𝐴 and
𝑠𝐶, maximize 𝑢𝐶 given 𝑠𝐴 and 𝑠𝐵 in 𝑆𝐴 × 𝑆𝐵 × 𝑆𝐶. Then,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) for all 𝑠𝐴 ∈ 𝑆𝐴,
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) for all 𝑠𝐵 ∈ 𝑆𝐵 ,
and
𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) for all 𝑠𝐶 ∈ 𝑆𝐶.
3We do not require
max
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
min
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
max
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
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They mean
arg max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐴,
arg max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐵 ,
and
arg max
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐶, .
We assume that the Nash equilibrium is symmetric in Group A, that is, it is symmetric
for Player A and Player B. Then, 𝑠∗𝐵 = 𝑠∗𝐴, and 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = 𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶). Also we have
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
Since the game is zero-sum,
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) + 𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 2𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 2𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = −𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
Thus,
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐶,
and
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐶.
They imply
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶),
and
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = max𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶).
First we show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The existence of a Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric in Group A, implies
Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of a player in Group A and Player C with symmetry in
Group A.
Proof. 1. Let (𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) be a Nash equilibrium of a three-players zero-sum game. This
means
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) (5a)
= min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
for Player A.
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ max𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) (5b)
= min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ max𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
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for Player B.
On the other hand, since
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
we have
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
This inequality holds for any 𝑠𝐶. Thus,
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
With (5a), we obtain
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶). (6a)
Similarly, for Player B we can show
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶). (6b)
(5a), (5b), (6a) and (6b) imply
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶),
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = max𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶),
min
𝑠𝑐∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
From
min
𝑠𝑐∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≤ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶),
and
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶),
we have
arg max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐴.
Also, from
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) ≥ 𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶),
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and
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
we get
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐶.
Similarly, we can show
arg max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠∗𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐵 = 𝑠∗𝐴,
and
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑠∗𝐶.
Therefore,
arg max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶),
and
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, 𝑠∗𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = arg min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵(𝑠∗𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶).
Next we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Sion’s minimax theorem with symmetry in Group A implies the existence of a
Nash equilibrium which is symmetric in Group A.
Proof. Let ̃𝑠 be a value of 𝑠𝐵 such that
̃𝑠 = arg max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶).
Then, we have
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶). (7)
Since
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) ≤ max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶),
and
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶),
we get
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = arg min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶). (8)
Since the game is zero-sum,
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) + 𝑢𝐵( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = 2𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = −𝑢𝐶( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶).
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Therefore,
arg min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶).
Let
̂𝑠𝐶 = arg min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = arg max𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐶( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶). (9)
Then, from (7) and (8)
min
𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
max
𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = max𝑠𝐴∈𝑆𝐴
𝑢𝐴(𝑠𝐴, ̃𝑠, ̂𝑠𝐶) = min𝑠𝐶∈𝑆𝐶
𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐶) = 𝑢𝐴( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, ̂𝑠𝐶). (10)
Similarly, we can show
max
𝑠𝐵∈𝑆𝐵
𝑢𝐵( ̃𝑠, 𝑠𝐵 , ̂𝑠𝐶) = 𝑢𝐵( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, ̂𝑠𝐶). (11)
(9), (10) and (11) mean that (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐶) = ( ̃𝑠, ̃𝑠, ̂𝑠𝐶) is a Nash equilibrium which is sym-
metric in Group A.
4 Concluding Remark
In this paper we have examined the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a con-
tinuous function and a Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric three-players zero-sum game
with two groups. We want to extend this result to more general multi-players zero-sum
game4.
Appendix: Example of relative profit maximizing three-firms
oligopoly
Consider a three-players game. Suppose that the payoff functions of players are
𝜋𝐴 = (𝑎−𝑥𝐴−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐶)𝑥𝐴−𝑐𝐴𝑥𝐴−
1
2[(𝑎−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐴−𝑥𝐶)𝑥𝐵−𝑐𝐵𝑥𝐵+(𝑎−𝑥𝐶−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐶−𝑐𝐶𝑥𝐶],
𝜋𝐵 = (𝑎−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐴−𝑥𝐶)𝑥𝐵−𝑐𝐵𝑥𝐵−
1
2[(𝑎−𝑥𝐴−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐶)𝑥𝐴−𝑐𝐴𝑥𝐴+(𝑎−𝑥𝐶−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐶−𝑐𝐶𝑥𝐶],
and
𝜋𝐶 = (𝑎−𝑥𝐶−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐶−𝑐𝐶𝑥𝐶−
1
2[(𝑎−𝑥𝐴−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐶)𝑥𝐴−𝑐𝐴𝑥𝐴+(𝑎−𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝐴−𝑥𝐶)𝑥𝐵−𝑐𝐵𝑥𝐵].
This is amodel of relative profitmaximization in a three firmsCournot oligopolywith con-
stant marginal costs and zero fixed cost producing a homogeneous good. 𝑥𝑖’s,𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶,
are the outputs of the firms. The conditions for maximization of 𝜋𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, are
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − (𝑥𝐵 + 𝑥𝐶) − 𝑐𝐴 +
1
2(𝑥𝐵 + 𝑥𝐶) = 0,
4Satoh and Tanaka (2018b) is an ealier version of such a research.
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𝜕𝜋𝐵
𝜕𝑥𝐵
= 𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − (𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐶) − 𝑐𝐵 +
1
2(𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐶) = 0,
and
𝜕𝜋𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝐶
= 𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐶 − (𝑥𝐵 + 𝑥𝐴) − 𝑐𝐶 +
1
2(𝑥𝐵 + 𝑥𝐴) = 0.
The Nash equilibrium strategies are
𝑥𝐴 =
3𝑎 − 5𝑐𝐴 + 𝑐𝐵 + 𝑐𝐶
9 , 𝑥𝐵 =
3𝑎 − 5𝑐𝐵 + 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑐𝐶
9 , 𝑥𝐶 =
3𝑎 − 5𝑐𝐶 + 𝑐𝐵 + 𝑐𝐴
9 . (12)
Next consider maximin and minimax strategies about Player A and Player C. The con-
dition forminimization of𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐶 is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐶
= 0. Denote 𝑥𝐶 which satisfies this
condition by 𝑥𝐶(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵), and substitute it into 𝜋𝐴. Then, the condition for maximization
of 𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐴 given 𝑥𝐶(𝑥𝐴, 𝑥𝐵) and 𝑥𝐵 is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0.
It is denoted by argmax𝑥𝐴 min𝑥𝐶 𝜋𝐴. The condition for maximization of 𝜋𝐴 with respect
to 𝑥𝐴 is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
= 0. Denote 𝑥𝐴 which satisfies this condition by 𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵 , 𝑥𝐶), and substitute it
into 𝜋𝐴. Then, the condition for minimization of 𝜋𝐴 with respect to 𝑥𝐶 given 𝑥𝐴(𝑥𝐵 , 𝑥𝐶)
is
𝜕𝜋𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐶
+ 𝜕𝜋𝐴𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐴
𝜕𝑥𝐶
= 0.
It is denoted by argmin𝑥𝐶 max𝑥𝐴 𝜋𝐴. In our example we obtain
argmax
𝑥𝐴
min
𝑥𝐶
𝜋𝐴 =
3𝑎 − 4𝑐𝐴 + 𝑐𝐶
9 , argmin𝑥𝐶
max
𝑥𝐴
𝜋𝐴 =
6𝑎 − 9𝑥𝐵 − 2𝑐𝐴 − 4𝑐𝐶
9 .
Similarly, we get the following results.
argmax
𝑥𝐵
min
𝑥𝐶
𝜋𝐵 =
3𝑎 − 4𝑐𝐵 + 𝑐𝐶
9 , argmin𝑥𝐶
max
𝑥𝐵
𝜋𝐵 =
6𝑎 − 9𝑥𝐴 − 2𝑐𝐵 − 4𝑐𝐶
9 .
If 𝑐𝐴 ≠ 𝑐𝐵 , argmax𝑥𝐴 min𝑥𝐶 𝜋𝐴 ≠ argmax𝑥𝐵 min𝑥𝐶 𝜋𝐵 , and they are not equal to the Nash
equilibrium strategies for Players A and B. However, if 𝑐𝐵 = 𝑐𝐴, we have
argmax
𝑥𝐴
min
𝑥𝐶
𝜋𝐴 = argmax𝑥𝐵
min
𝑥𝐶
𝜋𝐵 ,
and those strategies and the Nash equilibrium strategies for Players A and B are equal.
Further, when 𝑐𝐵 = 𝑐𝐴 and
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵 =
3𝑎 − 4𝑐𝐴 + 𝑐𝐶
9 ,
we get
argmin
𝑥𝐶
max
𝑥𝐴
𝜋𝐴 = argmin𝑥𝐶
max
𝑥𝐵
𝜋𝐵 =
3𝑎 − 5𝑐𝐶 + 2𝑐𝐴
9 .
This is equal to the Nash equilibrium strategy for Player C when 𝑐𝐵 = 𝑐𝐴.
9
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